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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss
the President’s proposal for a prescription drug benefit for the Medicare program.
That proposal recognizes the public’s concern that rising drug costs may be placing a
large and growing financial burden on Medicare beneficiaries.  About 30 percent of
those beneficiaries do not have insurance coverage for prescription drugs, and others
have only limited coverage.  The President’s proposal would provide some benefit for
most Medicare beneficiaries but, as currently specified, would provide little financial
protection for those who face extremely high spending for prescription drugs.
The proposed prescription drug benefit is part of a broader set of policies for Medicare
recommended in the President’s budget for 2001.  Those policies would expand
Medicare eligibility to new populations, reduce payments for certain covered services,
introduce innovations from the private sector to fee-for-service Medicare, and convert
Medicare+Choice into a competitive defined benefit program.
My testimony today will focus on the prescription drug proposal.  As background to
that analysis, I will briefly discuss spending by Medicare beneficiaries on prescription
drugs and the extent of the insurance coverage for that spending.  I will then describe
the President’s proposal and the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) most recent
analysis of that plan, including a newly revised estimate of the plan’s costs.  The new
estimate is about $11 billion higher than the one we reported in April in our analysis
of the President’s budgetary proposals.  My statement will conclude with some
observations on several design features that affect the cost and effectiveness of a
Medicare prescription drug benefit.
SPENDING AND INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
The majority of Medicare beneficiaries spend some money on prescription drugs in a
year, and a significant fraction of those beneficiaries have very high expenses.  In
1996, for example, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) estimates that,
in total, the average Medicare beneficiary spent more than $670 for prescription drugs.
(That includes both out-of-pocket expenses and any insurance reimbursement.)  About
87 percent of beneficiaries had some drug spending; about 7 percent had expenditures
of $2,000 or more (see Figure 1).
Several statistics suggest the significance of prescription drug spending by the
Medicare population.  Because Medicare beneficiaries are elderly or disabled, they use
more prescription drugs than the average person.  Medicare beneficiaries constituted
about 14 percent of the U.S. population in 1996 but accounted for about 40 percent of
the $62 billion spent in the United States on prescription drugs in that year. 
1. Under Part B, Medicare now pays for a limited list of outpatient drugs, such as intravenous chemotherapy
drugs that must be administered under the direction of a physician.
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In addition, drug spending by Medicare beneficiaries has grown at a more rapid rate
than spending on other health services.  Between 1995 and 1996, for example, total
drug spending by an average Medicare beneficiary grew by 12.2 percent, whereas
federal spending for Medicare benefits (on a per-beneficiary basis) grew by 7.2 percent
(see Table 1).  Those rates compare with 4.6 percent growth in gross domestic product
per capita over the same period.
The Medicare program does not cover most prescription drugs that beneficiaries take
on an outpatient basis, and to obtain such coverage, many beneficiaries turn to
supplemental coverage.1  In 1996, according to HCFA data, more than two-thirds of
beneficiaries had supplemental insurance that provided some drug benefits (see Table
2).  The sources of the coverage vary (see Figure 2).  Many Medicare+Choice plans
offer drug coverage as a supplement to their overall benefit package.  Other sources
are employer-sponsored and medigap (individually purchased) plans that include drug
coverage.  In addition, some beneficiaries are eligible for prescription drug coverage
under Medicaid or through other public programs.
Many Medicare beneficiaries have the option of enrolling in Medicare+Choice plans
that offer prescription drug coverage.  In 1996, nearly 95 percent of Medicare+Choice
enrollees were in such plans—typically, the coverage included a cap on the maximum
benefit, cost-sharing requirements, and a drug formulary.  (A formulary is a list of
drugs preferred by the plan's sponsor, in part because of their lower prices.)  Faced
with tightening financial circumstances in the past two years, however, an unusually
large number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have dropped out of the
Medicare+Choice program, and many of the plans offering prescription drug coverage
have pared benefits significantly.  One analysis suggests that only about three-quarters
of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare+Choice plans had drug coverage in 1998.
Employer-sponsored insurance is by far the largest source of prescription drug
coverage for Medicare beneficiaries.  In 1996, more than 11 million Medicare
beneficiaries had drug coverage through employer-sponsored plans.  But employers
often “carve out” drug benefits from their main benefit package, typically subjecting
them to more restrictions than are placed on other benefits.  Employers and health
plans have also turned to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which use formularies,
3utilization review, selective contracting with pharmacy networks, and other tools to
control the use of prescription drugs. 
Medicare beneficiaries may also purchase supplemental drug coverage through
medigap plans.  Such coverage is limited, however:  it requires beneficiaries to pay
half the cost of their prescription drugs after meeting a $250 deductible.  Benefits are
capped at either $1,250 or $3,000 annually.  Premiums for medigap plans offering
drug coverage are generally higher than for other medigap plans.  The higher
premiums are partly due to adverse selection (more people with greater need for health
care—and thus greater costs—enroll in those plans).
Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries have access to drug coverage through state
Medicaid programs.  Such beneficiaries include those who have income lower than
100 percent of the poverty level or medical expenses large enough to meet the
program’s spend-down requirements.  (Individuals may be eligible for Medicaid under
a state’s spend-down requirement if their monthly income less medical expenses is
below some maximum.)  The assets that those beneficiaries may own are also limited.
Medicare beneficiaries who meet those criteria are generally eligible for full Medicaid
benefits, including prescription drug coverage.  Other low-income people—those
designated as qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) and specified low-income
Medicare beneficiaries (SLMBs)—are eligible for subsidies for some Medicare
expenses but are not eligible for full Medicaid services or Medicaid drug coverage.
In 1996, about 3.9 million Medicare beneficiaries had supplemental drug coverage
through Medicaid.
Coverage for prescription drugs is also available through other sources.  Several states
have instituted special programs to provide drug coverage for the low-income elderly
or people with disabilities.  And some Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for drug
coverage and other benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs or the
Department of Defense.
People who have supplemental drug coverage consume more prescription drugs than
those without such coverage but spend less out of pocket.  In 1996, for example,
Medicare beneficiaries with coverage spent an average of $769 compared with $463
for those without coverage, according to HCFA’s estimates.  Conversely, those with
drug coverage spent less out of pocket:  in 1996, beneficiaries with coverage averaged
$253 in out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs (excluding premiums paid to
private insurers or HMOs).
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The President proposes to create a voluntary, outpatient prescription drug benefit under
a new Part D of Medicare.  That program would begin in 2003 and be fully phased in
by 2009.  It would pay half of the cost of prescription drugs, up to a specified cap.  The
insured half of the benefit would be financed equally by premium payments from
enrollees and by general tax revenues.  After taking cost sharing and premiums into
account, enrollees would pay 75 percent of the cost of covered drugs and the govern-
ment would pay 25 percent, up to the cap.  
The proposed benefit would be administered by a private-sector pharmacy benefit
manager in each region of the country, selected through competitive bidding.  The
PBMs that administer Part D would negotiate lower drug prices, on average, than are
currently paid by Medicare beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries who enrolled in Part D would
receive the benefit of those discounted prices on their prescription drug purchases,
including drugs they bought after exceeding the benefit cap.
Although the President's budget suggests earmarking $35 billion from 2006 through
2010 for a possible catastrophic benefit, no policy is specified.  Consequently, CBO’s
analysis does not focus on a catastrophic benefit, and our estimate does not include the
$35 billion earmark.
How the Benefit Would Work
In 2003, all Medicare beneficiaries would have a one-time chance to sign up for the
new benefit.  In later years, beneficiaries would be permitted to choose the Part D
option only when they first became eligible for Medicare.  The only exception involves
beneficiaries with certain other prescription drug coverage who lose that coverage
involuntarily (for example, when a former employer drops drug coverage for all
retirees in its health plan).
The new benefit would have no deductible and would generally pay 50 percent of an
enrollee's prescription drug costs, up to a maximum benefit of $1,000 in 2003.  That
benefit cap would gradually rise to $2,500 in 2009.  Thus, in 2009, a beneficiary who
spent $5,000 or more on prescription drugs would receive the maximum reim-
bursement of $2,500.  That beneficiary would also pay $575 in Part D premiums that
year.  After 2009, the cap would be indexed to annual changes in the consumer price
index (CPI).  Assuming that the cost of prescription drugs continued to rise more
rapidly than the CPI, the real value of the cap would shrink, thus eroding the benefit.
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the Medicaid program.  Medicaid would pay both the premiums and the cost-sharing
expenses under the Medicare drug benefit for participants who were also fully eligible
for Medicaid. For these so-called dual-eligibles, Medicaid would pay all drug costs not
paid by Medicare, including expenses above the cap.  Medicaid would also pay the
premiums and cost-sharing requirements for people who had limited assets and income
below the poverty line.  In both cases, the federal government would reimburse states
for those costs at the usual federal/state matching rate, which averages 57 percent.
Another group of low-income enrollees would also receive assistance with their
prescription drug costs.  The federal government would pay all of the premiums and
coinsurance for Part D enrollees with limited assets and income between 100 percent
and 135 percent of the poverty line, and part of the premiums for Part D enrollees with
limited assets and income between 135 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line.
Eligibility for those subsidies would be determined by state Medicaid agencies, but
unlike the assistance provided to dual-eligibles, the federal government would pay 100
percent of these costs.  Neither the federal nor state governments would be liable for
covering any drug expenses above the Part D cap for low-income beneficiaries who
were not fully eligible for Medicaid.
The President’s proposal also includes an incentive that is intended to retain employer-
sponsored drug coverage for retirees.  Medicare would pay employers 67 percent of
the premium-subsidy costs it would have incurred if the employers’ retirees had
enrolled in Part D instead.   In addition, enrollees in Medicare’s managed care plans
would receive their prescription drug coverage through those plans, which for the first
time would be paid directly for providing such coverage.
CBO's Cost Estimate
The new Part D provisions would add a total of $160 billion to federal costs through
2010, CBO estimates.  Of that total, $134 billion represents outlays for Medicare (net
of premium receipts), and $26 billion represents federal outlays for Medicaid (see
Table 3).  States would also face additional Medicaid costs.  CBO estimates that the
premium for Part D would start at about $24 a month in 2003 and rise to about $50 a
month in 2010.
CBO’s cost estimate assumes that most people who are enrolled in Part B of Medicare
would also enroll in Part D.  But the estimate takes into account the fact that some
beneficiaries who have employer-sponsored drug coverage for retirees would rather
2. HCFA will make such a revision in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey for 1997.  Previously, the
survey assumed that beneficiaries in employer-sponsored plans paid the full retail price for prescription
drugs.
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keep that coverage than opt for the new benefit.  In addition, CBO assumes that people
who are eligible for benefits under Part B but do not actually enroll would also not
enroll in Part D.  Under those assumptions, nearly 36 million people would sign up for
Part D in 2003, representing approximately 88 percent of total Medicare enrollment.
CBO’s estimate is about $11 billion higher than the estimate in our April report, An
Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2001.  Two
significant revisions have been made.  First, we adjusted the data on spending for
prescription drugs to recognize the discount that beneficiaries insured by employer-
sponsored plans receive through their PBMs.2  Second, we increased our estimate of
the cost of the new subsidies for low-income people.
CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING A MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT
The President’s prescription drug proposal has raised a variety of issues regarding the
design of such a benefit.  The specific features of a drug proposal determine the cost
of the program to federal and state governments and the effectiveness of the policy in
providing affordable access to pharmaceuticals for Medicare beneficiaries.  Some of
the important design issues that might be considered in assessing a Medicare drug
benefit include:
 The Nature and Value of the Benefit.  The proposed benefit is limited and does
not include stop-loss coverage, which protects beneficiaries against
catastrophically high spending on drugs.
 The Effectiveness of PBMs.  It is uncertain whether PBMs would aggressively
use formularies, coinsurance policies, and other methods to limit Medicare
costs.
 Program Participation.  Employers, who have been buffeted by rising drug
costs, are likely to reduce their retiree coverage under a Medicare drug benefit
instead of accepting a subsidy to retain their programs.  Medigap insurers are
also likely to restructure their plans to take advantage of the benefit.  In
addition, a drug benefit would reduce the incentive that Medicare beneficiaries
7now have to enroll in managed care plans rather than traditional fee-for-service
Medicare.
 Effects on Medicaid Costs.  The subsidy for low-income Medicare beneficiaries
is superimposed on the existing Medicaid structure, which necessarily
complicates the new benefit’s design and affects the cost of the program to both
federal and state governments.
The Nature and Value of the Benefit
Part D is designed to ensure that most enrollees would receive some benefit.  However,
because of the annual cap, it would not protect enrollees who have chronic conditions
and are dependent on prescription drugs from very large out-of-pocket expenses.  In
2003, for example, about 33 percent of participants would have drug expenses that
exceeded the $1,000 cap on Part D benefits.  By 2010, about 22 percent of participants
would have expenditures exceeding the benefit cap of about $2,560.  If drug costs
continued to rise faster than the CPI, an increasing proportion of beneficiaries would
have drug costs in excess of the maximum benefit cap after 2010.
Because the benefit cap would limit Medicare's exposure to increases in prescription
drug spending, it would also limit the value of the benefit to people who have the
highest drug costs.  A program that did not provide first-dollar coverage but limited
an enrollee's out-of-pocket costs to some annual maximum (or stop-loss amount)
would better protect beneficiaries with the highest drug spending.  Such a program
would make larger payments to fewer people than would a program that capped
benefits.
However, a redesigned benefit that protected beneficiaries more fully from
catastrophic costs could raise prices for some drugs because enrollees whose expenses
exceeded the stop-loss amount would be less price-sensitive.  The patent system
assigns exclusive marketing rights to the makers of most new drugs for some period
after their introduction.  Drugs with patent protection must compete with other
products offering similar therapeutic effects.  But manufacturers of particular drugs
that primarily benefit the elderly would have greater flexibility in pricing their products
under a Medicare drug benefit with stop-loss protection than they have now.  Such a
pricing effect is likely to be greater for plans that have more generous catastrophic
coverage or lower cost-sharing requirements.
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additional costs on other federal programs that purchase drugs (including Medicaid,
the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Defense).  Higher drug
prices could also increase the costs of private health insurance, leading to higher
premiums.  In that case, CBO would estimate somewhat lower federal revenues from
income and payroll taxes as a larger portion of employee compensation was paid
through nontaxed health benefits rather than through taxable wages.  
The Effectiveness of PBMs
As noted earlier, the President proposes to administer the prescription drug benefit
through private-sector pharmacy benefit management companies, which private health
plans use to negotiate price discounts and control utilization.  A single PBM, selected
through competitive bidding, would administer the benefit in each region.  CBO’s cost
estimate assumes that those PBMs would reduce costs by about 12.5 percent from the
level that an uninsured retail purchaser would pay—smaller savings than PBMs now
generate for large, tightly managed health plans. The savings are net of the
administrative costs incurred by a PBM in processing prescription claims.
PBMs save money for private-sector health plans in four main ways.  First, they
negotiate discounts with pharmacies that agree to participate in their networks.
Second, they obtain rebates from manufacturers of brand-name drugs in exchange for
preferred status on the health plan's formulary.  Third, PBMs use mail-order
pharmacies, which are often better able than retail pharmacies to save money.  Mail-
order pharmacies are likely to have lower average operating costs, and they may be
more likely to substitute generic or other lower-cost drugs for the ones prescribed.
Finally, PBMs establish differential copayment requirements that encourage
beneficiaries to select lower-priced options such as generic, preferred formulary, or
mail-order drugs.  Some PBMs also use management techniques such as on-line
utilization review and prior approval to evaluate care and encourage the most cost-
effective treatment practices.  A PBM can generally negotiate larger rebates if it can
shift more prescription purchases from one product to a competing product in the same
therapeutic class.
The President’s proposal would constrain the ability of PBMs to use their cost-saving
techniques.  For example, the proposal calls for dispensing fees to be high enough to
ensure broad participation by retail pharmacies.  That requirement could limit the
discounts that PBMs could negotiate from pharmacies.
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manufacturers.   The proposal specifies that beneficiaries would be guaranteed access
to off-formulary drugs when medically necessary and coinsurance requirements could
not exceed 50 percent.  Some private drug plans require enrollees to pay the full
difference between the cost of a brand-name drug and its generic equivalent (if one
exists) unless the prescribing physician specifically states that the brand-name drug is
medically necessary.  Such an approach would apparently not be permitted in the Part
D program proposed by the Administration.
The President’s proposal envisions competitive bidding to select the PBM for each
geographic area, but it is unclear what financial risks, if any, the winning PBM would
bear.  In the absence of financial risk, PBMs might not have a strong incentive to
generate savings under the program.  Yet, if they were placed at financial risk, PBMs
would have to charge higher premiums.
Another issue that needs clarification is how savings would be measured under a
Medicare drug benefit.  Actual savings could disappear, even though nominal discount
and rebate rates were unchanged, if the prices from which discounts and rebates were
calculated rose as a result of the new benefit.
Under the President’s proposal, a single PBM would administer the benefit in an area.
As an alternative, multiple PBMs in the same area could compete for shares of the
Medicare market.  Such competition might lead to more aggressive cost management,
but that outcome is by no means certain.  One potential drawback to a multiple-PBM
system is that PBMs might keep their prices low by seeking out healthier enrollees
with lower drug costs instead of focusing on cost management.  In that case, the
possible savings to the federal government would be dissipated.
Program Participation
If a Medicare drug benefit was enacted, private insurers would alter the type of drug
coverage they offered.  CBO’s estimate assumes that most people who participate in
Part B of Medicare would also participate in Part D.  Thus, employer-sponsored plans
and medigap insurance would generally offer their enrollees new options for
supplemental coverage.  Moreover, with a fee-for-service drug benefit in place,
managed care plans in the Medicare+Choice program could become less attractive to
beneficiaries.
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Employers would probably face lower costs for their retiree coverage under the
President’s proposal.  Firms that offered prescription drug coverage with benefits
comparable to those under the Part D program would be eligible to receive federal
payments equal to 67 percent of the Part D premium subsidy for eligible retirees.  That
subsidy payment—together with the tax exclusion of their health plan costs—would
induce some employers to keep full drug coverage in their retiree health plans rather
than eliminating it or wrapping their plans’ benefits around the new Part D package.
(Under a wraparound plan, Medicare would be the primary payer for prescription
drugs; the employer's plan would serve as a supplement.)  Few employers would be
likely to maintain full drug coverage, however.  CBO assumes that about three-quarters
of Medicare enrollees who now have drug coverage through a retiree health plan
would enroll in Part D.
Part D would offer a more generous drug benefit than standard medigap plans do, and
at a lower premium.  As a result, the three medigap plans that now offer drug coverage
would no longer be competitive.  For its estimate, CBO assumed that those plans
would be replaced by one that supplemented the coverage offered under Part D by
filling in the 50 percent coinsurance “gap.”
Another possible effect of a Medicare prescription drug benefit is to reduce the
attractiveness of managed care plans, which typically offer prescription drug coverage
to their enrollees.  That benefit is often cited as an important factor in beneficiaries’
choosing managed care over traditional fee-for-service Medicare.  Although managed
care plans might become somewhat less competitive with enactment of a Medicare
drug benefit, the President has proposed other policies that would create new
incentives to compete on the basis of price as well as quality through a competitive
defined benefit program.  However, CBO assumes that offering a drug benefit in the
fee-for-service sector would dramatically slow the growth of enrollment in
Medicare+Choice.  In 2010, for example, CBO projects that enrollment in
Medicare+Choice plans would reach 14.1 million under current law but only 11.6
million under the President’s proposal. 
Effects on Medicaid Costs
The President’s proposal would increase Medicaid’s costs for drugs and other
benefits—substantially in the case of federal costs and less sharply in the case of state
costs.  Although Medicaid would no longer have to pay all drug costs for Medicare
beneficiaries who now receive full Medicaid benefits, those savings would be more
than offset by additional Medicaid spending on behalf of other Medicare beneficiaries.
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Part D would pay for a portion of the drug costs that Medicaid now pays for Medicare
enrollees who are fully eligible for both programs.  That expansion of Medicare’s role
would lower both federal and state Medicaid costs by shifting them to Medicare.  But
the savings would be partly offset by the Part D premiums that Medicaid would have
to pay for those dual-eligibles.
Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries who are not eligible for full Medicaid
benefits would also become eligible for assistance to pay for their Part D premiums
and cost sharing.  To receive that assistance, however, eligible Medicare beneficiaries
would have to enroll at a state welfare office, and not all of them would choose to do
so.
The President's proposal would increase Medicaid spending for services not related to
the new drug benefit.  The availability of a free drug benefit, made possible by
enrollment in Medicaid, would attract more Medicare beneficiaries into the Medicaid
program.  In turn, that increased enrollment would boost spending for other benefits
that Medicaid pays for as well as the prescription drug benefit.
CONCLUSION
The President’s prescription drug proposal has both pluses and minuses that must be
weighed in assessing its effects.  The proposed coverage would provide some
assistance to most Medicare enrollees.  Because the benefit is capped, however, the
proposal would offer little financial protection to beneficiaries with a high level of
drug spending.  In 2003, for example, about a third of enrollees in the new Part D drug
benefit would spend more than the benefit cap for prescription drugs.  And the cost of
the proposal would be significant.  Spending on prescription drugs is the fastest-
growing component of health care costs.  Even with a capped benefit, the proposal
would increase federal outlays substantially.
The specific details of a prescription drug proposal greatly affect the program’s costs
and value to beneficiaries.  The level of coinsurance, the existence of a benefit
maximum versus a stop-loss provision, the split in financing between beneficiary
premiums and taxpayer subsidies, and the nature and degree of subsidies for low-
income beneficiaries and employers all drive the value of the benefit and its costs.  The
role of the PBMs is equally critical.  In attempting to create a competitive environment,
the President’s drug proposal establishes geographically exclusive PBMs but limits the
scope of their activities.  As a result, their effectiveness in managing costs is uncertain.
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Developing a prescription drug benefit in the Medicare program raises numerous
difficult issues.  Since the inception of Medicare in 1965, the cost of prescription drugs
and their clinical importance have grown dramatically.  As drugs became a critical
component of modern health care, more than two out of every three Medicare
beneficiaries turned to some form of supplemental coverage for their drug expenses.
Those arrangements have led to very large variations across beneficiaries in the
comprehensiveness, cost, and financing of their prescription drug spending.  That
variety complicates the task of rationalizing prescription drug coverage and makes
developing such a benefit for Medicare a complex policy challenge.
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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
BY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, CALENDAR YEAR 1996
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office using unpublished data from the Health Care Financing Administration's Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey Cost and Use File, 1996.
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FIGURE 2. SOURCES OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES (In percent)
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on John A. Poisal and George S. Chulis, "Medicare Beneficiaries and Drug Coverage,"
Health Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 (March/April 2000), p. 251.
a. Includes Medicare beneficiaries who switched their source of coverage during the year; those eligible for benefits through other public
programs such as Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Defense, or state pharmaceutical assistance for low-income elderly
people; and those enrolled in non-risk-based health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
15
TABLE 1. GROWTH OF DRUG SPENDING AND MEDICARE BENEFITS
PER BENEFICIARY, CALENDAR YEARS 1995-1996
Average Spending per 
Beneficiary (Dollars)
Percentage 
Change from
1995 1996 1995 to 1996
Drug Spending 600 673 12.2
Medicare Benefits 4,953 5,312 7.2
Memorandum:
Gross Domestic Product
per Capita 28,130 29,430 4.6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the Health Care Financing Administration’s unpublished tabulations of the Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey Cost and Use File, 1995 and 1996.
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TABLE 2. MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, BY TYPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE
AND DRUG-COVERAGE STATUS, CALENDAR YEAR 1996
Type of Supplemental Insurance
Number of
Beneficiaries
(Millions)
Number of
Beneficiaries with
Drug Coverage
(Millions)
Percentage of
Beneficiaries with
Drug Coverage
Medicare Risk-Based HMO 3.2 3.1 95
Medicaida 4.4 3.9 89
Employer-Sponsored Coverageb 12.9 11.4 89
Individually Purchased Coverage Only 9.8 3.9 40
All Other Supplemental Coveragec 0.7 0.6 81
No Supplemental Coverage 2.9 0 0
Switched Coverage During the Yeard   3.3   2.7 83
All Medicare Beneficiaries 37.2 25.6 69
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on John A. Poisal and George S. Chulis, “Medicare Beneficiaries and Drug Coverage,”
Health Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 (March/April 2000), p. 251.
NOTE:   HMO = health maintenance organization.
a. Includes Medicare beneficiaries receiving full Medicaid benefits as well as qualified Medicare beneficiaries and specified low-
income Medicare beneficiaries.
b. Includes Medicare beneficiaries with both employer-sponsored and individually purchased supplemental insurance.
c. Includes other public programs such as Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Defense, and state pharmaceutical assistance
programs for low-income elderly people, as well as non-risk-based HMOs (cost and health care prepayment plans).
d. Includes Medicare beneficiaries who did not spend 100 percent of their Medicare-eligible months in one insurance category.
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TABLE 3. CBO’S ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL
FOR A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT IN MEDICARE
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)
Total,
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2003-
2010
Medicare
Spendinga 15 21 26 30 35 38 44 48 257
Part D premium
receipts -8 -11 -13 -15 -17 -19 -22 -24 -129
Subsidy to health
plans for
retirees * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Medicaid Spending  1   2   3   3   4   4   4   5   26
Net Effect on
Federal Spending 8 13 17 19 22 24 27 30 160
Memorandum:
Monthly Part D
Premium (Dollars) 24.00 24.80 32.10 33.30 39.90 41.50 47.90 50.70 n.a.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: Numbers may not add up exactly to totals because of rounding.
* = less than $0.5 billion; n.a. = not applicable.
a.  Includes administrative costs of $0.4 billion in 2002.
